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AESTHETIC ALIENATION
AN D THE ART OF MODERNITY

Rory J. Conces
University of Nebraska at Omaha

The world pictured by Uie modem artist is. like the world mediated upon
by the existential philosopher, a world where man is a strnnger.
- William Barret~ Irrational Man: A Study in
Existential Philosophy (1958)

He [Hegel) did not have the feeling of being plunged into a challenging
,world of alienation in his time, as we do today when confronted by the
production or abs1tact and nonobjective an.
-Hans-Georg Gadamer, ''111c Relevance of the
Beautiful" (1986)
Introduction
Not long ago the walls of the world's great an museums were covered with
realist poruaiture. landscapes. and sacred scenes. Thai was pre1ty much 1he
exrent of canvas art. During the las1 hundred years. however. the scope of
museum collections has become much more diverse. One can still find a
lifelike portrail by Rubens, an idyllic landscape by Constable, or a sublime
Christ scene by Raphael. Indeed, U1ere even seems to be a bias towards
realist an, what the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty called
the "objectivist" prejudice.' It is as though we expect art to function as a
<lescription of the world in which we live. But museums have also become
showcases for mo<lern painting, that is, so-called abstract painting. Works
of this son seem to be disengaged from the recognizable featwes of our
everyday world. from the same features that enable us 10 feel that we belong
to !his worl<l, and thus seem 10 res isl our objccti vist prejudlce. 2 In ilS extreme
fom1, thlsdetachmem from thesurrounding world appears to be nothing less
than an obliteration of the familiar. a <lisruption in the man-world relationship. References to familiar things are no longer evident. With no clue as
to what is represented, such painting exhibits an "inli<lelityto the familiar. "3
But if abstract painting renounces the world of physical appearance as itS
starting point. our feeling of being at home in that world may give way to the
feeling of alienation that is alluded to by Barrett and Gadamer.
A sense of esrrangement was sure!y felt by much of the viewing public
when these paintings made ll1cir debut on u,e art scene. Their siruggle to
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orient each painting int wo-dimensional space, so as to find some recognizable object and keep their objcctivist perspective, was nolh.ing less than an
encounter with somelh.ing alien. But what about all the generations of
viewers that have followed them? Are we less likely 10 experience aesthcUc
alienation? In this paper. I propose 10 show that aesthetic alienation is less
likely 10 be experienced by present-day "objectivist" viewers of abstract art
as long as their cognitive funds are gradually enriched by the scientific and
technological advances of the 1wentlcth cemury. 'This is because such
enriched funds. by providing a particular mode of access to the world. allow
today's spectators 10 recognize and identify much more of the pictorial
content of paintings that those viewers who first confronted thc works of
abstract pai ntcrs.
Pan One: Abstrac1 Painting
Let us begin by considering the son of art that is commonly associalcd
with acsll1elic alienation. namely. abstract painting. In spite Of the fact U1at
the Romanticism of John Constable's East Anglia landscapes is easily
distinguished from the Ahstrac1 Expressionism of Clyfford Still's asymmetrical planar formations. it is imponam to no1e that art.ists and art
historians have found themselves in a quandary over the nature of abstract
art. The art historian Marcel Brion remind< us nf this ctifficnlly In the
following passage:
Few icnns in lhe vocabulary or Ilic history or art lend llicmsclves so
much to confusion and cquivoca1ion as the word ''abs1tact." Tbis is
beeause no vahtl tleliniuon of II actually exisL~ and.even more so. because
!here is no agrccmcm abou1 lhe nature of lheworks 10 which onecan apply
lhc tcnn .•
Yet much oflhls discussion comains ccnain adjectives designating the
world of abstract an.terms like ' non-objective' and 'non-representational' .5
Perhaps the best way to understand how these terms apply to abstract
painting is 10 compare their application with the use of the terms 'objective'
and 'rcp,-esentational' in describing rcaliSl painting. that is. painting that
approaches "observation and ponrayal of the day-to-day essence of thlngs
and beings, while adding to U1is objective truU1 as much as it can contain of
the subjective feelings of Uie anist.''6
Let us take. for cxa.mptl:. Ute work of Winslow Homer ( 1836-1910),
perhaps the most effec1jve and well-known spokesman for American
Realism. Homer's Breezing Up (1876) is a fine example of such art. He
brings 10 life a scene in which three boys are out sailing with a Fishennan.
It is ohjective aml representMi0031 insofar as it is a ponrayal of several
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objects in recognizable form; U1e likeness between Homer's painted images
and lhe physical objects is strong. Of course. there is much more to this
painting than aset ofimages that rcscmbleobjects in the world. Homer gives
us. among other things. a vivid perception of New England life as well as an
expression of his warm Jove for nature. Dy focusing on recognition of
features resembli ng lh.ings in the world, which is at the heart of realist (or
naturalist) rcpresematJon (in contrast to symbolic [or conventional) represen1ation), we have underlined U1c imponancc of representation as It rel ates
to the meaning of this work of an.'
If we construe meaning or the function of a sign to be referential, then
meaning involves three terms: first, an objec1that functions as a sign or
vehicle of meaning; second. another objcc1 U1a1 is meant by the sign; and
lh.ird. an in1crpreter for whom the two objects are united by the relation of
meaning.• Inrealist painting. then, wehaveanobject inthefonnof acolored
shape on Uie canvas. the sign, and another object, the referent of the sign,
which is a Uling in the world. In Uic case of Breezing Up. the representations
(or signs) tha1 Homer gives us are qujte falUiful to that which they signify.
The waves, for instance, look like the waves that can be seen on the surface
of any large body of water. But surely not so faithful that the painted waves
that appear to splash against his sailboat arc present-at-hand rather than
represented. for they would never wet a vlc.,.'Cf's outStrctcllec! nand. "No
painting," ii is said, "is ns concrete as an objec1in na1urc•... " 9 Toe point
here is not that Homer's waves fall to achieve lhiee-cli mcnsionality. Rather
it is the point that the images or designs on the canvas (the signilicrs), like
the waves in Breezi11g Up, resemble physical objec,ts in the world (the
signified).
But not all paint.ings have representations as realistic as those of
Homer's, which is to suggest that realism Is a matter of degree. 1lle
acsthetician Monroe C. Beardsley makes this point in his Aesthetics when
he writes that "representational design ... [is) more or less abstract. ...
•Abstract' Is the converse of ·realistic,' in one ofits senses: 10 say that A is
a more abstract representation than D is the same as to say that O is more
realistic Uinn A." 10 Take, forexamplt:, Edvard Munch'sThe Scream (1893)
and GeorgesOraque'sHousesa11dTrees(l 908). Munch'seffons are to turn
away from the details of the publicly recognizable world to one that Is
dist.oned, bizarre, and fantastic. Similarly, we find Oraque's geometrical
slmplifical.ions to illustrate a belabori ng of Uie familiar. Yet we continue to
recognize many of the objects that serve as signs; for example, a screaming
person and a landscape of trees and buildings respectively. In other words.
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P:11'1 Two: Aesthetic Alienation
1llisstecrini;away from reilist painting may not come withOutexacling
a very high price. however. Whereas we feel a certain familiarity with what
is depicted in rcnlist painting. we often find non-representational paintingtO

be alien. Thus it shOuld come as no surprise ti1at philosophers like Barrett
and G:idamer find aesllletic alienation to be a concomiunt of our viewing
modern or abstract arL
Eighteen years after the appearance of Trwlt and Method. Gadamer
published The Re/evtu1ce of the Benwif11/ and Other Essays. Gadamcr finds
the alienation that arises from abstract an to be nothing less than a separation
from the aesthetic aspect of the cultural life of society. It is defined In terms
of an "enormous gap between the traditional form and content of Western
art and the ideals of contemporary :irtJsts."" Form and content are both
crucial in this regard. 1l1e strict adherence to traditional form, which
Included an uncompromisi ng respect for linear perspective, solidity, and
three-dimensionality. has been made incidental. if not altogether repudiated
by modern non-representational artists beginni ng with the Cubist movcmentin U1cearly 1900s. lllis response, according to G3damer. was the start
or a profound transformation in an. for it "led to the total elimi nation or any
reference to an external object of the process of anistic creation."•' In
addition, there was the break with traditional content, which construed man
as a rational animal living in a familiar and intelligible world. According t0
Barrett, then, this break with tradition means that
everything is ques1ionabtc, 1iroblernmlc... . Hence the themes that obsess
ho1h modem art :>nd exiswntial philosorhy are the alicna1i.., and suangeness of man in his world; the contradic1orincss. feebleness. and contingency of human existence: the central and overwhelming reality of time
for man who has lost his anchorage in the eternal."
Although this wholesale divorce from tradition may be overstated, Gadamcr
is nevertheless convinced of its importance:
It rcmnlns an open question whether (l( not Uiis denial of our realistic
expectations is ever really total. But one thing is quiteccnain: the naive
assumpt.ion that lhe picture is a view- like that which we bnvedaily in our
experience or nnture or of nature shaped by man-h:u clearly been
fundamentally destroyed. We can no longer see a Cubist picture oc a
nonobjective p:1in1ing at a glance. with a merely passive gaze. We must
make an active conuibu1ion or our own and maxe an elTon 10 synthesize
the outlines of the various ptnncsas Uiey appear on tile canvas. Only then,
perhaps. can we be seired and uplifu:d by the profound harmony and
rightncs.~ or a work, in the smne way a.~ readily happened in carHcr times
on the basis of a pictorial content co1runon to all."
The most cursory reading of Gadamer's works. then, suggcslS that
contemporary abstract and non-objective an is unfamiliar to us. and it is this
unfamiliarity that ls part and parcel of Its alienating naturc.w In U1e main,
aesthetic alienation is an inability to relate toat least some works of an which
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thedeslgns in both paintings have enough in common with the objects in the
world to represent them. Tus is even true. though to alesscrextent,ofworks
by Wassily l<Jlndinsky. At first gl:ince. his lmproeisation No. JO (19 13)
appears 10 be nothing more than "chaos" on canvas, but which, upon
prolonged examination. provides us with a few Images tMt resemble,
among other things. two canon.
.
Toe "infidelity to the familiar." however, can become so excessive that
there seems 10 be nothing less than an obliteration of all worldly form. The
psychologist or an Rudolf Arnheim echoes and reinforces this point when
he writes:
Art bas become incomprehensible. Perh3ps nothing so much as this fact
distinguishes an todayfmm what it has 00:11 at any olller place oc time. Art
baS always been used. and thought of.as a meansofinu:rpreling tbe nature
of world ,u,d life to humnn eyes nnd ears; bul now lhc objects of art arc
awarenlly :unong the most puzzling implements mru,hasevcr made. Now
it is they th3t need inu:rpretation."
This is also acknowledged by Orion. who suggests that this infidelity is
common in works of abstract an, since they do not seek out their forms
among those already existent in the world. There is. so to speak, a radical
upheaval in the artist's relationship with nature, resulting in what appears to
be artistic creation ex niltilo (owing nothing to objective or external
reality)." Taken 10 its extreme. only rorms like geomculcal figures would
be used which means that theanist considers only "two-dimensional space.
a plane ~urfacc, and rejecting any spatial illusionism or even any allusion at
all to a third dimension:·u
Tus apparent obliteration is found in the work of Abstract Expressionists like those of the New York School in the late forties and nrucs (Jackson
Pollock. Mark Rothko. Mark Tobey. among others). The school was an
attempt 10 liberate an from the need to present an object; a shift away from
"tilings" and an emphasis on the "incorp0rcal field." 14 WheU1cr we look at
Pollock's B111e Poles (1963). RoU1ko's Red. \Vltite, and Brow11 ( 1903), or
Tobey's Harvest ( 1958). what we find is nothing like the realist paintings
that incorporate the familiar objects of the world. As James K. Feibleman
notes. it is small wonder mat some nave defined non-objective painting as
15
"bare of representative meaning and stripped to the minimum of contenl."
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eventually leads 10 a feeling of separa1ion. of esuangemem, of disunity on
the part of Uic viewer. In short. U1c viewer Jacks the proper rela1edness to
these works and is separated from at least a portion of the cultural life of a
society.it Regardless of the extent and intensi1y of this estrangemen1, Its
basis Is always the same: a confrontation willl the unfarniUar. The person
gazing at U1c painting docs not recognlzellle plc1orial contents as portraying
things in lllc world. TI1ecotorcd shapes on the canvas do not represent Utlngs
for that person. It therefore lacks the son of referential mearung that is
associated with representational 3!1. There is an object which is thought to
function as a sign as well as an interpreter of this object. But there appears
to be no object thal is meant by the "sign," that is. a referent in the world. We
have Jost the amalgam of sign and referent
Of course. some migh1 argue that this definition of aesthetic alienation
is 100 limiled insofar as it only covers one son of alienation. that is. the
alienation that stems from an absence of any sort ofidcntification of the kind
of object we are dealing with, whether it be a sailboat. a fisherman, or blue
sky. What it does nol include. they might argue (and rightly so). is aesthetic
alienation wW1 reganl 10 how somcU1lng is portrayed. A feminist aestheUclan,
for example. might argue vehcmenlly Uiat she experiences a feeling of
separation. of es1tangcmen1. of disunity whcnc,-cr she views one of the
earliest trc3llllcnts of the femala nude in the Renaissance, that is, Sandro
Ooticelli 's The Birth oJVe1111s (aflcr 1482). In shOn , she is unable to rela1e
to this work of 3!1. ancl is therefore alienated from il Moreover, a similar
response might be given by some men who view certain paintings. Indeed.
some men may be no more able to rd ate to the bru1ali1y depicted in Nicolas
Poussin's The Rape a/the S11bi11e Wome11 (before 1637)or the arrowriclclled
body of a saint in Andrea Mantegnas's St Sebc,stim1 (about 1455-60) than
women arc able to relate to the naked women in Ono Dix's Three Women
(1926) or the partially clothed females in Pablo Picasso's Th•o Women
R111111i11g 011 a Beach ( 1922). To rnlk about "kinds" of aesU1ctic aliena1ion.
however. ls not so much a challenge 10 thedcflniUon of aesU1euc alienation
that is used in this paper. especially since the paper's focus is abstract art, as
it is a reminder that we can experience alienation even while we view the
paintings of artists like Cons1ablc and Homer, albeil a less fundamental sort
of alienation given that one mus1 he able 10 identify an object before one can
be alienated from it in terms of how the object is portrayed.
The key to apprecia1ing this lapse in recognition. regardless oflhc kind
of alienation, may be found in whal Gadamcr and others have said about
perception. panicu l:trly aes1hetic perception. Perception ls not something
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Ulat lacks "cognitive strands," as Gadamcr con1ends in the following
passage:
Perception is never a simple reflection of what is presented to the senses.
... [P]erception conceived as :m adequate response 10 a stimulus would
never be a mere mirroring or what is there. For it would always remain M
understanding orsomctlting as something.... Pure seeing and pure hearing
arc dogmruic abstractions which attilicially reduce pllenomena. Perception always includes mcaning.n
In an ex1temcly perceptive work dealing with this passage, Joel C.
Wcinsheimer notes that Gad:uncr clearly shows us
tb:11perception, even aesthetic percep1ion. is n0t naiumlly or originally
pure. It is "impure" in being always meaningful: we do not bear pure
sounds but always a car in the street, a boby crying; we do nOI see pun:
colors and shapes but always a face, a knife, a wrcatlt ur smoke."
But allllough Wei nsheimer argues for U1e meaningfulness of perception, he
does believe thal a peison can "look at something in such a way that It is 'just
there,' so that we seejust what is there. "14 The point here is not just that pure
seeing is a distinct possibility. Rather it is U1c more important poinl tha1 lhis
son of seeing is not primary bul secondary. It is a derived seeing !hat Is far
removed from our uuerances about this or that thing that reflect the richness
or our language.
Gaaamer is not alone in imbuing aesthetic perception with meaning.
'The cognitive na1urc of aesU1ellc perception is perhaps best presented in E.
H. Gombrich's most influential work.Art and lllusio11. Theroleof"mind
sets" and "schemas." items which arc akin 10 what I refer 10 as "cognitive
funds," is indicated in his reference to U1c "myth of the innocent eye":
Whenever we receive a visual impression. we react by docketing i~ filing
i~ grouping it in one way or another, even if the impression is only that of
an inkb!Ot or a fingerprint. Roger Fry and the impressionists talked or the
difficultyoffindingout what things lookcd likc 10 an unbiased eye because
of what they called the "co,1ocp1ual habits" necessary 10 life. But if these
habits arc necessary co life, the postulacc of an unbiased eye llemands the
impossible.... The innocent eye is a myth."
Seeing is. inshon. never just a1113Uerofregistering unconceptualizcd sensedata. According 10 Gombrich, then, there is no separalion between Impressions and cogniti vc constructions.26 The perception of art entails a person's
cognitive fund, 3nd it is this fund, acquired over many years, that allows a
person to see whal others. who have acquired a sintllar fund, see. To be sure,
many of us have similar cognitive funds that allow us to see U1e same
building, dog. or automobile. And this applies to paintings as well. If the
distinctive characteristics or a sailboat are part of a person's cognitive
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... , .,, . .. --··--repertoire. Iha! person is likely lo recognize and identify some of the painled
objecls as sailboals when he or she looks al Homer's Breezing Up.
lnlerestingly enough, il is this notion of cognitive fund that Unks
alienalion to abs1rac1 an. Some persons feel alienaled when they look at
abstracl painlings, either having no idea whal 10 say or making comments
such as "l don't undersland art these days," because they find certain works
of art 10 be unfamiliar or unrelaled to the world U1ey live in, and U1ese works
are unfamiliar or unrelaled because !hey do nol reOecl the individual's
cognitive fund. Bul must the presem-day viewer of abstract an have such
an experience? I believe this need nol be the case. In facl, I believe today's
audience is less likely 10 be alienalcd by such an.
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Part Three: Acslhetic Alienation and Cognilive Funds
ll mighl be argued lhal U1e experience of aesthetic alienation increases
in scope and imensiiy as a person becomes more educated If so. alienation
is direcll y prop0rtional 10 the growth of one's cognitive fund. "If alienation
is more widespread now then it used 10 be." says Waller Kaufmann, "it is
because more people receive more education today than formerly.''27 This
is qulle plausible given the earlier discussion of the kind of aesthetic
alienalion that sicms from how something is portrayed 10 the objeclivist
viewer. It might be said oflhc fcmalcacsthctician, whose cognitive fund has
undergone a change such that she now declares herself lo be a "feminist
aeslhetician." lhat her sludy or gender relations has left her unable 10 relate
to Boticelli ·s depiction of women. thereby explaining her alienation from
his The Birth of Venus. The converse may also be true, however. A person
may be less apl 10 experience aesll1etic alienation as lhe scientific and
lechnological achievemenls of lhe age are added to his or her cognitive
stock. 'This is because the sons of images lhal seemed to be unfamiliar or
unrelaled to lhe world are gradually identified as being a part of our world.
This is not lo say that no one undergoes U1e experience of alienation when
viewing abslracl an. Dul whal was though! 10 be abstract and nonrepresenlational fifty years ago may not be construed as such today. As an
acute observer of our age has put il:
By the late twentiethcen1ury. in ways nevcrbcforcconceivable, images of
the incomprehensibly small and the unimaginably large became part of
everyone's experience. The cuhure saw photographs of galaxies and of
atoms. No one has lO imagine, witll Leibniz, what the universe might be
like on microscopic or telescopic scales-microscopes an<l telescopes
made those images part of everyday experience."
Such images, then, give us a point of reference for some of what we find in

abstracl painting. This leads Fcibleman 10 claim thal non-objecti vc art does
represent, and lherefore it is entirely inaccuralC lo conceive of it as nonrepresentational. The represenlalions cllffer from those found in the works
of nineteenlh-cenlury Realisls like Homer insofar as lhey are representations of abstractions lhal parallel ll1e abstractions of lhe world of science. 29
Whal are thought of as non-objective works of an are not non-objective at
all, but ac1ua11y works of art Iha! represent lhe Jess familiar world of science.
~ this can take place without the arlisl 'Sinlention of doing anything of the
lcind. As Fe1bleman puts it, when he remarks on the work or various
members of lhe New York School:
Pollock's pruntings endeavor to attain to a kind of qualitative chaos, asllllC
of perfecl disorder. They could as well have re)Tescn1ed a photomicrogrnph Of Cal cortex, or tile paths of the molecules in a heated gas enclosed
w1tll1~ a rec1.1ngular vessel. Witll a linlc patienl searching among photographtc plates of d,s1.1nt galaxies, one might find thal the paintings of de
Koonmg and of Tobey are reprcscnuuional after all.'°
We can clarify !his broadening of the scope of representational painting
lo include some. if nol all, works thought 10 be abstracl, by citing specific
examples in which isomorphisms can be discerned between images from
artisls and images from scientisls. The works oflwo American artists, the
Abstracl Expressionisl Barnell Newman and the Constructionist Charles
Biederman clearly suppOrt this expansion. Newman's Vir Heroicus Sublimis
(1950, 1951) is an extremely large canvas (eight by eighteen feet), the
background of which is a single homogeneous color, a monochromatic field
of cadmium red. divided by "zips" or exceedingly thin strips of the same
color or conlrasling color U1at splil the huge red expanse vertically. At first
glance, it may nol offer lhe viewer wiUt a familiar Image, with a configuration of paint arranged on U1e canvas lhal resembles and, thus, represents
something in the world. But ll1e siluation is much diffcrcnl for the viewer
who is well-acquainted with aiomic absorption spectroscopy. Vir Heroicus
Sublimis resembles !hat pon ion of1hedark-linespec1rumof sunlighl that has
a wavelcng{li of approximately 700 nm (the red band of lhe spectrum). Toe
only difference is U1a1 Newman's painting has vertical slrips of red. while.
and yellow-brown, whereas lhe dark-line spectrogram of sunlight has dark
"Fraunhofer" lines. Co11s1ruc1io11 (1940), by Biederman, is a much smaller
work made of painted wood and metal rods lhal crisscross one anolher.
Again, looking at Ulis work may nol remind lhe viewer of anything in the
world. Having some knowledgeofX,raycllffraction. however, will provide
the viewer willia cogniiive fund U1at will al leas! make il p0ssible lhal he or
she will see a struciural configuralion in this work of art U1a1 is similar to the
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divergent beam X-ray diffraction patterns from single crystals of Chemical
substances. Isomorpltisms such as these. then, suggest that in at least some
cases. what was once ll1ough1 10 be an escape from nature turns out to be
nollting of the kind. TI1ey are more or less a means of glimpsing and
comprehending Ille world Illar we live in.
To make Ille inference that a few isomorphisms demonstrate that
abstract art in general is representational , of course. is anolller matter:
Picking out a couple of works that are isomorphic is not sufficient to make
such a generalization. Pan of the problem. however. is that to become aware
of these isomorphisms requires the appropriate cognitive fund, a fund that
is only established after some study of the discipline. Ard lltis is something
lllat few of us ha veover a wide range ofdisciplines. Yet 10 find considerable
resemblance in Ille i mages offered to us by artists in paintings and mixed
media projects by doing no more Ulan p0inting to a few spectrograms and
X-ray diffraction patterns says something about the p0ssibili1y of finding
further isomorphisms. The investigation of lltings large (for example,
galaxies) and small (for example, particles) provides us wiU1 innumerable
instances of similarity and, thus. familiarity. It i s just a matter of having a
cognitive fund lllat is tuned 10 such imagery.31
Of course, some philosophers might sugge.~1caution at lltis point. One
such philosopher is Deardsley, who distinguishes between suggestive and
non-suggestive non-representational painting. Beardsley appears to be
critical of any attempt to expand U1e scope of representational an, not simply
because he seems unwilling to reduce the number of notable and distinctive
characteristics that a design must have in common with an obj ect in nature
for the design 10 depict something, and hence, to represent somellting. but
because he thi n.ks Uiat not having enough of these characteristics still allows
a design to at least suggest an object in the world willlout representing it. 32
So ii is not an all or none proposition for him. Abstract expresslon1St
paintings, for instance, have "areas U1a1 suggest, however vaguely, such
lltings as insects, femalcbodies, crees, machinery, and rocks, though willlout
representing them, and U1e suggestions of different areas cohere to some
degree. " 33 Tilis is suggestive non-representational art, exemplified by such
works as Willem de Kooning's Woman and Bicycle (1952-53) and Woman
as a llmdscape (1953-55). However. there are non-suggestive nonrepresentational designs: "They are the designs that are mostly limited to
straight lines, a few primary colors. and quite regular and simple shapes
willlout deptll- those that arc frequently cal led 'geometrical ' ... ."J<
Beardsley would, no doubt. find Newman's Vir HeroicusSublimis to be an
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exemplar of such a design, because it has an insufficient number of notable
and distinctive characteristics in common with anything, including Ille
spectrogram of sunlight, for it to be either representational or suggestive.
Willi regard 10 Ille Janer, the insufficient number of characteristics would
make it more of a case of ''reading something into the design." As Beardsley
writes about such art,
I suppose one could say lha1a squareon Ille balhroom noorsuggestsa box,
a cabin, or a barn. but U1is would be an odd and unnecessary way of
speaking. lf you cannot connect these suggestions with suggestions from
olher shapes in the pauem, it would be more like reading something into
Ille design lhan seeing what is !here."
My response 10 his di scussion is twofold. First, Beardsley does not
make clear how many and what kind of characteristics a design must have
in common with a particular object for it to represent or suggest. Where do
we draw the line between representational and non-representational paintings? Furthermore. ctoes Ulis not have something to do with the son of
cognitive fund that a person i sworking from? It is unlikely that a viewer will
see what appears 10 bea barn when he or she looks at Vir fleroicus S11blimis,
though not someUli ng U1a1can be rejected out of hand. Dut for Ille viewer
to say lllat ii resembles Ille red band of !he dark-line spectrogram of sunlight
becomes more likely if he or she is fam iliar with absorption spectrosc.opy.
And second. even if we accept Beardsley's distinction. representation
and suggestion still have something in common, that is, they both involve
familiar characteristics bet ween the design and an object in Ille world. And
this is imp0nant, for wheU1cr an individual undergoes !he experience of
aesthetic alienation i s dependent upon having an objcctivist prejudice as
well as a cognitive fund U1at does not allow U1e viewer to be familiar with
the sons of objects that may be referred to by the painting.
A note shOul d be Interjected here concerning the conc.Iilions of aesU1etic
alienation, for what has been discussed so far ntight suggest that the only
way in which a viewer with an objcctivist prejudice can become less
vulnerable to aesthetic alienation is by enhancing his or her cognitive fund
through learning about Ille latest scientific discoveries and iechnological
innovations. But to say tllis would be to unduly restrict tJ1e scope of
cognitive enhancement and to associate it wiU1 j ust one condition, i.e., the
familiarity condition. l11e problem wiU1 this is that cognitive enhancement
can also occur by learning about an- its technical aspects. its history, and
its art.ists-which could replace the ohjectivi st prejudice with an approach
lllat is Jess encumbered by asearch for the familiar. Thus, learning about art
may have Ille beneficial effect of making the viewer less likely to experience
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alienation. But for the great mass of people who do not partake in this son
of cognitive enhancement, it will be tl1tough the assimilation of knowledge
about science and technology that will underlie their increasing resistance
to aesthetic alienation.
Following Feibleman's line of argument. then, we find the images of
science and technology in the abstractions of today's an, allowing us to
become attached to the world without the experience of aesthetic alienation.
It is by stressing the dyad of resemblance-representation that we find more
and more that is familiar in what we see when we took at abstract paintings.
With an enriched conceptual fund, an objectivist viewer may not only say
"I see an expanse of red," but he or she may say "That looks like a
spectrogram." It is this enrichment. perhaps more Ulan anything else. which
helps to solidify our attad1ment to abstract works of art.
Conclusion
To whatever degree of abstraction a painting may attaln. the worldliness
of that painting is measured by the degree to which its appreciators undergo
tlle experience of alienation. Toe more a person's cognitive fund is enriched
by tile assimilation of modern scientific discoveries and technolog1cal
innovations, the less likely heor she will experience aesthetic alienation. If
our cognitive funds are truly fashioned in this way, and if attenation is in
inverse proportion to our familiarity wiU1 the images that wt: see when we
look at a painting, then the appropriation of science and technology into our
36
lives will lead 10 a reduction in aesU1etic alienation.
Tilis implication leads me to the following final thought. What has been
discussed so far is twcnticth·ccntury Western art and soc iety. But what
about ar1 forms of other societies? 11 is no1too terribly difficull to imagine
a people who are totally immerse~ in, for example. traditional Amazonian
an rather Ulan the cosmopolitan an of Brazil. And to make it more
interesting, let us suppose U1at the traditional art is representational. Would
anyone in such a traditional society experience aesthetic alienalio_n? Woul~
there be persons estranged from at least a portion of the cultural life of their
community? Probably. In llliscase. however, the distinguishing characteristic between those who are alienated and those who are not would be closely
associated wiU1 the age of Uie individual insofar as U1e younger members of
the community would nol have sufficiently appropriated the knowledge of
his or her forefathers through oral histories. Each of their cognitive funds
would not be as developed as U1ose of the elders oflhecommunity. To think,
then. Uiat a day will come when aesthetic alienation will be an experience
oflhe past is to dwell upon the fantastic. There will always be those whO feel
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separated from some aesU1etic aspect of their culture so long as there are
differences in the cognitive funds of' the members of the community.
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